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The Endorsement Court 
Jay D. Wexler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1986, when William H. Rehnquist was confirmed as the 
sixteenth Chief Justice of the United States,1 the Supreme Court has 
virtually rewritten the entire law regarding the First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses.2 With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Court, in its 1990 Employment Division v. Smith3 decision, reversed 
years of jurisprudence and held that the First Amendment does not 
entitle religious believers to exemptions from neutral laws of general 
application. On the Establishment Clause side, the Court recently 
overturned a series of its earlier decisions on its way to creating a 
body of law quite amenable to the funding of religious 
organizations.4 As long as government money passes through the 
hands of private individuals who themselves choose how to spend 
that money from a set of options that does not encourage religious 
choices, the arrangement will be constitutional.5 With regard to 
legislative accommodations for religion, the Court has made clear 
 
 * Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. The author would like to thank 
the student editors at the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy for putting together a 
terrific symposium, and the participants at the symposium, particularly Tom Berg, for 
extremely helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. The author also thanks Greg 
Dekermenjian for his excellent research assistance. 
 1. Chief Justice Rehnquist took the judicial oath to become the Chief Justice on 
September 26, 1986; he had previously served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
since January of 1972. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited May 16, 2006). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist passed away in September of 2005. 
 2. Those Clauses state that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 4. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997). 
 5. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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that legislatures have significant leeway to grant exemptions to 
religious believers from general laws, subject only to a few important 
limitations.6 Most recently, in Locke v. Davey,7 the Court granted 
political decision-makers parallel authority to accommodate religious 
non-belief by holding that the state of Washington could refuse to 
fund theology majors from its general college scholarship program. 
Finally, the Rehnquist Court was the first to apply the so-called 
“endorsement test” to evaluate the constitutionality of government-
sponsored religious symbols and displays. The endorsement test was 
developed by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Lynch v. 
Donnelly,8 a 1984 case involving a Pawtucket, Rhode Island, display 
of a crèche surrounded by various holiday “figures and decorations,” 
and adopted by five Justices in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,9 a 
1989 case involving two different holiday displays in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. The test asks whether a “reasonable observer” would 
feel that the government has sent “a message to nonadherents that 
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and 
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.”10  
Although the Supreme Court itself has applied the endorsement 
test in only a handful of cases, the test has played an extremely 
important role in how courts throughout the country have evaluated 
government action. Lower federal courts and state courts have 
applied the test in hundreds of cases11 to evaluate the constitutionality 
of many types of religious symbols and displays, from a Latin cross 
erected on a city water tower,12 to the “In God We Trust” inscribed 
on U.S. currency,13 to Mississippi’s state flag,14 to Ohio’s state 
 
 6. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 7. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 8. 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 9. 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989). 
 10. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 11. See William M. Howard, Annotation, First Amendment Challenges to Display of 
Religious Symbols on Public Property, 107 A.L.R.5TH (2003). 
 12. Mendelson v. City of St. Cloud, 719 F. Supp. 1065 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (disallowing 
symbol). 
 13. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 
2000) (disallowing display). 
 14. ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio 
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motto.15 As such, the endorsement test is one of the Rehnquist 
Court’s most important Religion Clause innovations. 
Since its inception, the endorsement test has been the subject of 
intense scholarly and judicial criticism. Commentators have argued, 
for example, that the test lacks historical support, threatens the 
dignity of the federal courts, and contradicts the Court’s own 
accommodation jurisprudence.16 Three other critiques, however, are 
perhaps of greatest importance. The first contends that the test 
inappropriately elevates symbolic harm or mere offense to 
constitutionally cognizable injury. The second argues, on a variety of 
specific grounds, that the test is incoherent and incapable of 
consistent application. The third critique suggests that the test favors 
majority religious traditions over minority ones, because the judges 
who must decide whether a symbol or display sends a forbidden 
message are themselves generally adherents of a majority tradition.17 
The thesis of this Article is two-fold. First, it argues that the 
majority bias critique is the most persuasive criticism of the 
endorsement test, followed (at some distance) by the contention that 
application of the test compromises the dignity of the federal courts. 
What unites these two critiques is that they focus not on the content 
of the endorsement test itself, but rather on the identity of the 
decision-maker applying the test. The Article also proposes a possible 
radical solution to these two critiques by suggesting that Congress 
could create an Article I court staffed by experts in a wide range of 
majority and minority religious traditions. This court would decide 
endorsement challenges to religious symbols or displays, subject only 
to discretionary (but full) Supreme Court review. As this Article 
notes, creation of such a tribunal would raise a variety of difficult 
constitutional (and other) issues, but such a proposal would, 
nonetheless, be worthy of Congress’ serious consideration. 
The Article proceeds in two main parts. Part II briefly introduces 
the endorsement test and its primary critiques. It then evaluates those 
 
1998) (upholding the motto: “With God, All Things are Possible”). 
 15. Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding use of the St. 
Andrew’s Cross on a flag). 
 16. See infra notes 53–79 and accompanying text. 
 17. For discussion of these three critiques, see infra notes 53–79 and accompanying text. 
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critiques and argues that the majority bias critique is the most 
persuasive criticism of the endorsement test. Part III proposes a draft 
statute that would establish an Article I “Endorsement Court” to 
decide endorsement challenges to government-sponsored religious 
symbols and displays. It then discusses the potential constitutional 
issues raised by the statute and argues that the advantages of such a 
statute would outweigh its disadvantages.  
II. THE ENDORSEMENT COURT, ARTICLE III STYLE 
A. The Supreme Court 
The holiday display challenged in the Lynch litigation involved, in 
the words of the Supreme Court: 
[M]any of the figures and decorations traditionally associated 
with Christmas, including, among other things, a Santa Claus 
house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a 
Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such 
characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds 
of colored lights, a large banner that reads “SEASONS 
GREETINGS,” and the crèche . . . which . . . consists of the 
traditional figures, including the Infant Jesus, Mary and 
Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals.18 
When the First Circuit struck down this display,19 it did so on the 
grounds that the religious display favored Christianity over other 
religions, and thus deserved strict scrutiny review under the Court’s 
decision in Larson v. Valente,20 which invalidated a statute that 
“denied an exemption from certain registration and reporting 
requirements to religious organizations receiving more than half of 
their total contributions from non-members.”21 Because the town’s 
display lacked any legitimate secular purpose, the First Circuit held 
that it failed Larson’s strict scrutiny standard.22 The First Circuit’s 
 
 18. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). 
 19. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 20. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
 21. Donnelly, 691 F.2d at 1034 (citing Larson, 456 U.S. 228). 
 22. Id. at 1035. 
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analysis is particularly interesting because it illuminates the fact that 
prior to the Supreme Court’s creation and adoption of the 
endorsement test, courts did not analyze cases involving the 
government display of religious symbols differently from any other 
case involving alleged state promotion or advancement of religion. 
In Lynch, the Supreme Court did not announce any new standard 
to evaluate religious displays. Chief Justice Burger’s majority 
opinion upholding the display simply noted that it did not have the 
primary effect of advancing religion.23 However, Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence planted the seeds for a new standard.24 Justice O’Connor 
attempted to “clarif[y] [the Court’s] Establishment Clause doctrine”25 
by explaining that the government can violate the clause through 
either “excessive entanglement with religious institutions”26 or 
“government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”27 According to 
O’Connor, the government may neither act with the purpose of 
endorsing religion, nor convey a message of endorsement, even in the 
absence of an actual intention to endorse.28 With respect to the latter 
problem, O’Connor wrote: “What is crucial is that a government 
practice not have the effect of communicating a message of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only 
practices having that effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, 
that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in 
the political community.”29 Pawtucket’s holiday display had neither 
the forbidden purpose nor effect, according to Justice O’Connor, both 
because it was intended as a “[c]elebration of public holidays, which 
have cultural significance” (purpose)30 and because “the overall 
holiday setting” of the included crèche “negate[d] any message of 
endorsement” of the display’s religious content (effect).31 
 
 23. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 682–84. 
 24. Id. at 687–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 25. Id. at 687. 
 26. Id. at 687–88. 
 27. Id. at 688. 
 28. Id. at 690. 
 29. Id. at 692. 
 30. Id. at 691. 
 31. Id. at 692. 
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Five Justices adopted the endorsement test as law in 1989, three 
years after Justice Rehnquist was confirmed as Chief Justice. In the 
Allegheny case, the Court reviewed two different Pittsburgh holiday 
displays: a crèche sitting alone on the Grand Staircase of a county 
courthouse, and an eighteen-foot menorah placed next to a forty-five-
foot Christmas tree and a sign reading “Salute to Liberty.”32 The 
Court struck down the crèche display,33 but upheld the other 
display,34 in a convoluted series of opinions that disagreed on, among 
other things, whether the meaning of the larger (but more secular) 
tree should be understood in light of the meaning of the smaller (but 
clearly religious) menorah, or vice versa.35  
Although determining the precise holding of Allegheny is a 
difficult exercise requiring patience, attention to detail, and perhaps a 
pencil and notepad to record which Justice voted how and on what 
issue,36 it is clear that five Justices believed that the endorsement test 
was the proper test for evaluating the constitutionality of the displays. 
For example, in his opinion for the Court invalidating the crèche 
display, Justice Blackmun concluded that “by prohibiting government 
endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits precisely 
what occurred here: the government’s lending its support to the 
 
 32. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578–82 (1989). 
 33. Id. at 579. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Compare id. at 617 (“The widely accepted view of the Christmas tree as the 
preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season serves to emphasize the secular 
component of the message communicated by other elements of an accompanying holiday 
display, including the Chanukah menorah.”), with id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Even though the tree alone may be deemed predominantly secular, it can 
hardly be so characterized when placed next to such a forthrightly religious symbol [as the 
menorah]. . . There can be no doubt that, when found in such company, the tree serves as an 
unabashedly religious symbol.”). 
 36. Just as one example of how convoluted this set of opinions is, consider the 
introduction to Justice Blackmun’s lead opinion: 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the 
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III–A, IV, and V, an opinion with respect to 
Parts I and II, in which JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE O’CONNOR join, an 
opinion with respect to Part III–B, in which JUSTICE STEVENS joins, an opinion 
with respect to Part VII, in which JUSTICE O’CONNOR joins, and an opinion with 
respect to Part VI. 
Id. at 578. 
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communication of a religious organization’s religious message.”37 
Elsewhere in the same opinion, he wrote: 
In sum, Lynch teaches that government may celebrate 
Christmas in some manner and form, but not in a way that 
endorses Christian doctrine. Here, Allegheny County has 
transgressed this line. It has chosen to celebrate Christmas in a 
way that has the effect of endorsing a patently Christian 
message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ.38 
The various opinions in Allegheny provide additional details 
regarding the nature of the endorsement test. Specifically, they make 
clear that the entire context of the challenged display, particularly its 
historical context, is important for evaluating the display’s 
constitutionality. For example, describing Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
in Lynch, Justice Blackmun noted that the endorsement “inquiry, of 
necessity, turns upon the context in which the contested object 
appears.”39 Justice O’Connor, for her part, elaborated on her Lynch 
test by noting that “the endorsement test depends on a sensitivity to 
the unique circumstances and context of a particular challenged 
practice and, like any test that is sensitive to context, it may not 
always yield results with unanimous agreement at the margins,”40 and 
by explaining that “the ‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice is relevant 
because it provides part of the context in which a reasonable observer 
evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice conveys a 
message of endorsement of religion.”41 
The Court has applied or invoked the endorsement test in a 
handful of cases since it decided Allegheny,42 most notably in Capitol 
Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,43 in which it held that 
the state of Ohio had not violated the Establishment Clause by 
allowing the Ku Klux Klan to display a cross on the grounds of the 
state capitol. The deciding opinion was penned by Justice O’Connor, 
 
 37. Id. at 601. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 595. 
 40. Id. at 629 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 42. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 43. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
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who found “no realistic danger that the community would think that 
the [State] was endorsing religion or any particular creed . . . by 
granting respondents a permit to erect their temporary cross on 
Capitol Square.”44 Justice O’Connor went on to explain that the 
relevant perspective for endorsement purposes is not the “actual 
perception of individual observers, who naturally have differing 
degrees of knowledge,”45 but rather “the reasonable observer . . . 
[who] must be deemed aware of the history and context of the 
community and forum in which the religious display appears.”46 
Justice O’Connor believed that such a reasonable observer would not 
have viewed Ohio’s actions as endorsing Christianity because he or 
she would have observed “the Klan’s cross display fully aware that 
Capitol Square is a public space in which a multiplicity of groups, 
both secular and religious, engage in expressive conduct.”47 
Most recently, the Court, in its final term led by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, appeared to use the endorsement test, at least in part, to 
invalidate Ten Commandments displays in two Kentucky 
courthouses.48 In finding that the history of the displays—in 
particular, the fact that they were erected only after a court 
invalidated two previous displays that were manifestly religious49—
evidenced an improper religious purpose, the Court employed 
endorsement language and quoted central passages from Lynch, 
Allegheny, and Capitol Square.50 Among others, the Court made 
numerous references to the “reasonable observer,” suggesting at one 
point that “[n]o reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the 
Counties had cast off the objective so unmistakable in the earlier 
displays.”51 
 
 44. Id. at 772 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 45. Id. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 46. Id. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 47. Id. at 782 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 48. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
 49. Id. at 2740–41. 
 50. See id. at 2733, 2737, 2738. 
 51. Id. at 2740. In the companion case to McCreary, the Court upheld a longstanding Ten 
Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas Capitol. See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 
U.S. 2854 (2005). The deciding vote in that case was issued by Justice Breyer, whose opinion 
casts some doubt on the continuing validity of the endorsement test; Justice Breyer himself did 
not invoke the test, instead stating that he “see[s] no test-related substitute for the exercise of 
legal judgment.” Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
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Of course, with Justice O’Connor’s retirement, the Endorsement 
Court may soon disappear, depending on whether her replacement 
finds the test persuasive.52 As a result, this is a particularly opportune 
time to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the endorsement test 
and whether Congress should consider taking steps to indicate its 
approval of the test. 
B. Endorsement Test Critiques 
Judges and scholars have subjected the endorsement test to 
withering critiques since its inception. The following summarizes 
some of the more important criticisms of the test. The discussion is 
not comprehensive, but simply introduces these critiques to provide a 
background for the Article’s later arguments. 
First, some have argued that the endorsement test finds no support 
in early American thought regarding the proper relationship between 
church and state. Michael McConnell is perhaps the most notable 
proponent of this view, though he does not press the point 
particularly strongly in his critique of the endorsement test.53 Pointing 
to the First Congress’ thanksgiving resolution, among other things, 
McConnell argues that “[t]he early practice in the Republic was 
replete with governmental proclamations and other actions that 
endorsed religion in noncoercive ways,”54 and that “[t]he generation 
that adopted the First Amendment viewed some form of 
governmental compulsion as the essence of an establishment of 
religion.”55 Under this view, a government sponsored crèche, for 
instance, could not be considered an establishment of religion 
because it coerces nobody, and because the framing generation 
believed that some sort of actual coercion was a sine qua non of an 
establishment violation. Of course, this view rests on the implicit 
 
 52. See Adam Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting 
Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135. 
 53. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
115, 154 (1992) (noting that he “will not elaborate the point here”). 
 54. Id. at 155. 
 55. Id. at 154–55; see also Steven D. Smith, Separation and the “Secular”: 
Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 957 (1989) (noting that the 
endorsement test is “lacking in historical and textual support”). 
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assumption that current constitutional doctrine must be consistent 
with the framing generation’s original intent. 
Second, some have argued that the endorsement test is 
inconsistent with the Court’s accommodation doctrine. The 
accommodation doctrine allows political decision-makers to exempt 
religious believers from generally applicable legal requirements, so 
long as the exemption alleviates a governmentally imposed burden on 
the believer’s free exercise of religion, does not overly burden non-
beneficiaries, and is administered neutrally among different religious 
traditions.56 According to these critics, any legislative 
accommodation or exemption from a generally applicable law 
necessarily endorses religion. Again, McConnell argues that the test  
casts suspicion on government actions that convey a message 
that religion is worthy of particular protection—as any 
accommodation of religion necessarily does . . . [t]here is no 
way to distinguish between government action that treats a 
religious belief as worthy of protection, and government action 
that treats a religious belief as intrinsically valuable.57 
Likewise, Jesse Choper suggests that “[w]hen the state exempts a 
minority religion from a generally applicable prohibition, such as 
permitting members of Native American religious groups to use 
peyote as part of their rituals, this . . . may reasonably be viewed as 
government endorsement of religion.”58 Choper even goes so far as to 
argue that including religious groups in a broad category of both 
religious and non-religious beneficiaries of government funding or 
other benefits—a practice clearly appropriate under Supreme Court 
doctrine (and perhaps required in some instances)—is also an 
endorsement of religion.59 Under this analysis, the endorsement test 
is flawed because it is patently inconsistent with another important 
aspect of the Court’s Religion Clause doctrine. 
 
 56. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 57. McConnell, supra note 53, at 151. 
 58. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 
499, 532 (2002). 
 59. Id. at 531. 
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Third, some have criticized the endorsement test for involving the 
federal courts in what can only be described as a ridiculous 
enterprise. For example, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit 
once famously suggested that the test “requir[ed] scrutiny more 
commonly associated with interior decorators than with the 
judiciary.”60 He further observed that “[i]t is discomfiting to think 
that our fundamental charter of government distinguishes between 
painted and white figures—a subject the parties have debated,”61 and 
that “[i]t would be appalling to conduct litigation under the 
Establishment Clause as if it were a trademark case, with . . . 
witnesses testifying that they were offended—but would have been 
less so were the crèche five feet closer to the jumbo candy cane.”62 
Justice Kennedy echoed these sentiments in Allegheny when he 
claimed that the test “threatens to trivialize constitutional 
adjudication.”63 To illustrate his point, Kennedy mocked Justice 
Blackmun’s application of the test to the crèche on the county 
courthouse staircase. He noted: 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN embraces a jurisprudence of minutiae. A 
reviewing court must consider whether the city has included 
Santas, talking wishing wells, reindeer, or other secular 
symbols as “a center of attention separate from the crèche.” 
After determining whether these centers of attention are 
sufficiently “separate” that each “had their specific visual story 
to tell,” the court must then measure their proximity to the 
crèche. A community that wishes to construct a constitutional 
display must also take care to avoid floral frames or other 
devices that might insulate the crèche from the sanitizing effect 
of the secular portions of the display. The majority also notes 
the presence of evergreens near the crèche that are identical to 
 
 60. Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 130. 
 63. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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two small evergreens placed near official county signs. After 
today’s decision, municipal greenery must be used with care.64 
Although these critiques may appear to be mere rhetorical 
flourishes intended to ridicule a test flawed on other grounds, I 
believe they represent an important independent criticism. They 
suggest that the test, whatever its other flaws, is undesirable because 
it is beneath the federal courts’ dignity to concern themselves with 
such “marginialia” as the placement and appearance of objects.65 
Although the critics do not make the point explicitly, inherent in their 
ridicule appears the suggestion that continued application of such an 
absurd and undignified test will bring disrepute on the courts and 
undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 
A fourth critique contends that the endorsement test wrongly 
elevates mere offense, alienation, or symbolic harm to judicially 
redressable injury. As Jessie Hill recently put it, this 
line of criticism takes issue with the notion that courts should 
be asking the endorsement question at all, arguing that the 
symbolic injury on which the endorsement test is centered 
should not constitute constitutionally cognizable injury, or that 
the injury involved—the injury to individuals’ sensibilities—is 
too subjective to produce a meaningful and predictable 
jurisprudence.66 
This harm-focused critique has taken several forms. For example, 
Stephen Smith has argued that the alienation that the endorsement 
test seeks to alleviate is unavoidable in our religiously diverse 
society; any government action, including the articulation and 
application of the endorsement test itself, will inevitably alienate 
somebody’s religious beliefs.67 Thus, the test, according to Smith, is 
 
 64. Id. at 674–75 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations 
omitted and emphasis added). 
 65. Id. at 676. 
 66. B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the 
Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 507 (2005). 
 67. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment 
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 309–12 (1987). Smith also 
disputes Justice O’Connor’s purported link between endorsement and the political status of 
non-adherents. See id. 
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“simply unworkable.”68 Jesse Choper, for his part, finds the redress 
of mere “distressed sensibilities”69 inconsistent with principles of 
federal court review, arguing that such redress “run[s] counter to the 
general precept that the awesome power of judicial review should not 
readily be invoked to remedy harm no greater than ‘indignation,’ 
‘offense,’ or the ‘psychological consequence presumably produced 
by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.’”70 Bill 
Marshall, although defending the endorsement test on other 
grounds,71 argues that the test must be understood to protect against 
more than offensive government conduct to prevent inconsistency 
with the Court’s free speech jurisprudence.72  
Fifth, many have argued that the endorsement test is inherently 
incoherent and incapable of consistent application. Again, there are 
many variations on this general critique. McConnell, for example, 
argues that the test is nothing more than a Religion Clause version of 
the “I know it when I see it” principle because “[w]hether a particular 
governmental action appears to endorse or disapprove religion 
depends on the presuppositions of the observer, and there is no 
‘neutral’ position, outside the culture, from which to make this 
assessment.”73 Choper finds fault with the notion of the “reasonable 
observer” as well, arguing that it is difficult to know “whose 
perceptions ought to count,” as well as what “level of knowledge 
[should be] attributable to the reasonable observer.”74 Smith contends 
that the concept of “endorsement” itself is ambiguous and likely 
 
 68. Id. at 305–12. 
 69. Choper, supra note 58, at 521. 
 70. Id. at 530 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 510 (“I do not believe that mere feelings 
of offense should rise to the level of a judicially redressable harm under the Establishment 
Clause, absent any real threat to religious liberty.”). 
 71. See William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It:” The Supreme Court and 
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 498 (1986) (“I will argue that despite its problem of 
inherent subjectivity, a symbolic understanding of establishment may appropriately provide a 
cohesive framework under which establishment jurisprudence may be remodeled.”). 
 72. See William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free 
Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 353 (1991) (“I conclude that the infusion of an 
offensiveness component into religion clause jurisprudence is inappropriate and should be 
eliminated.”). 
 73. McConnell, supra note 53, at 148. 
 74. Choper, supra note 58, at 511. 
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impossible to clarify.75 Most recently, Jessie Hill has invoked so-
called “speech act theory” to criticize the concept of “context” in the 
endorsement test. Specifically, she argues that “the indeterminacy 
and unpredictability in the application of the endorsement test are . . . 
inherent in the problem of attempting to determine the social meaning 
of symbolic government action against the backdrop of extreme 
viewpoint plurality, without the potentially stabilizing element of 
subjective intent to guide the inquiry.”76 Although all of these 
versions of the critique focus on somewhat different problems, they 
all suggest that the endorsement test is inherently amorphous and 
indeterminate, and therefore impossible for lower courts to apply in 
anything but an inconsistent ad hoc manner. 
Finally, a number of scholars have argued that the endorsement 
test is inherently biased in favor of majority religious traditions. Once 
again, Jessie Hill puts it well by noting that the 
societal power structure . . . makes the religious symbols and 
practices of dominant groups seem natural, and therefore 
dictates that the speech act of endorsement is only successful 
when it appears to exceed what it considered a ‘normal’ 
amount of government approval . . . [which] is likely to be 
greater with respect to majority, mainstream religions, whose 
practice and culture are more closely tied to the history and 
culture of the United States.77 
McConnell echoes this view, arguing that “[m]essages affirming 
mainstream religion . . . are likely to be familiar and to seem 
inconsequential. As Justice O’Connor has interpreted her approach, if 
a practice is ‘longstanding’ . . ., it is unlikely to ‘convey a message of 
endorsement. . . . In our culture, most ‘longstanding’ symbols are 
those associated with Protestant Christianity.”78 Other commentators, 
including Steven Gey and Larry Tribe, have criticized the 
 
 75. Smith, supra note 67, at 276–83. Smith also critiques the “objective observer” 
concept, among others. See id. at 292–95. 
 76. Hill, supra note 66, at 494. 
 77. Id. at 521; see also id. (“By refusing to take into account the differences between 
majority and minority religions, the Court’s endorsement test analysis threatens simply to 
reproduce unconsciously the majority perspective and to reinforce majority religious power.”). 
 78. McConnell, supra note 53, at 154. 
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endorsement test on similar grounds.79 This critique focuses in part 
on the formulation of the endorsement test, particularly its attempt to 
exclude “ubiquitous” acknowledgements of religion from 
invalidation, but it also focuses on the nature of the decision-maker 
applying the test. As will be discussed below, the problem of 
majority bias is far greater when the decision-makers themselves are 
members of a majority tradition and are, therefore, much less likely 
to view a symbol of that majority tradition as anything more than a 
harmless acknowledgement of a long-standing cultural belief. 
C. Assessing the Critiques  
This section explains why the majority-bias critique of the 
endorsement test is the most compelling of the critiques discussed 
above. In my view, the main problem with the endorsement test is not 
the content of the test itself, which generally asks the correct question 
about the constitutional propriety of religious symbols and displays,80 
but rather the nature of the tribunal that must apply the test in 
particular cases. 
In my view, the originalist critique of the endorsement test carries 
little weight. McConnell’s suggestion that non-coercive 
endorsements were common in the early republic may well be correct 
given the Free Exercise Clause’s prohibition on religious coercion,81 
but the notion that the Establishment Clause protects only against 
compulsion runs into the persuasive and well-known 
 
 79. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1293 (2d ed. 1988); 
Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 
481 (1994) (“By employing an ‘objective observer’ to decide questions of endorsement, Justice 
O'Connor relays the message to religious minorities that their perceptions are wrong; or, even 
worse, that their perceptions do not matter.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious 
Equality: Justice O’Connor’s Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 32 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 837, 851 (2001) (“The issue of endorsement seems particularly germane to 
cases involving government displays of religious symbols.”); Hill, supra note 66, at 495 (noting 
that in cases dealing with religious displays, “the endorsement test’s focus on the symbolic or 
‘expressive’ harm caused by religious symbols is entirely appropriate”); Marshall, supra note 
72, at 355 (noting that the endorsement test is “supported by sound considerations”); id. at 355 
n.23 (summarizing the “virtues of the endorsement inquiry”); Shari Seidman Diamond & 
Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713, 715 (2001) (arguing that the 
“prohibition of endorsement is an indispensable element of the Establishment Clause”). 
 81. See McConnell, supra note 53, at 155. 
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counterargument that such an interpretation renders the clause 
redundant.82 Moreover, the fact that governmental proclamations of 
religion that did not “favor[] one sect over another”83 were prevalent 
during the founding era does not necessarily suggest that the framers 
believed that endorsement of a particular tradition or sect, as a crèche 
display arguably does, would also be constitutionally appropriate.  
More to the point, however, the historical argument rests on a 
controversial assumption regarding the relationship between original 
understanding and contemporary interpretation that I do not share. 
This is not an appropriate forum for hashing out the arguments in 
favor of and against originalism as an interpretive method.84 It may 
be true that if one subscribes to this method, the endorsement test (at 
least as currently framed) would likely not survive. However, it is 
worth noting that the endorsement test would not be the only victim 
of an originalist re-reading of the Establishment Clause; indeed, it is 
possible that the entire doctrine would require scrapping.85 An 
originalist reading of the Establishment Clause seems particularly 
inappropriate given the vast increase in religious diversity in the 
United States over the past two hundred years, the history of religious 
persecution and violence in America and elsewhere during that 
period, and the growth of secularism as a significant intellectual 
force. These developments have resulted in a church-state milieu far 
different from the one in which the framers lived in ways that 
rightfully affect how we should understand the clause, at least under a 
pragmatic view of constitutional interpretation.86 
 
 82. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
195, 205 (1992) (“But the Establishment Clause cannot be mere surplusage. If the Free Exercise 
Clause standing alone guarantees free exercise of non-religion, the Establishment Clause must 
do more than bar coercion of non-believers. Thus a “coercion” test for establishment would 
reduce the Establishment Clause to a redundancy.”). 
 83. McConnell, supra note 53, at 155. 
 84. For arguments in favor of originalism, see, for example, ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). For critiques of 
originalism, see, for example, RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).  
 85. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727-33 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing on originalist grounds that the Establishment Clause only prohibits Congress from 
interfering with a state establishment of religion). 
 86. For examples of pragmatic constitutional theory, see, for example, Stephen Breyer, 
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The criticism that the endorsement test is inconsistent with the 
Court’s accommodation doctrine is also not particularly persuasive. 
The Court allows legislatures to accommodate religious beliefs by 
granting exemptions from generally applicable laws if they are 
burdensome to religion, so long as the exemption is applied even-
handedly among different faiths and is not overly burdensome to non-
beneficiaries.87 When a legislature accommodates religion in such a 
way—for example, by allowing Native Americans to ingest peyote as 
part of a religious ceremony—it does not endorse the “truthfulness 
and value” of the religion,88 but rather simply recognizes that, for 
many people, religious belief is an important basis for thought and 
behavior that deserves respect. Even if this distinction is not crystal 
clear to everyone, nothing prevents the Court from simply 
announcing (as it basically has) that accommodations otherwise 
meeting constitutional requirements will not be considered 
endorsements.  
In his critique, Smith argues that such a carve out for legislative 
accommodations is incoherent because it rests on distinguishing 
between legislators acting “because they believe in religion (in which 
case the measure would probably be considered an invalid 
endorsement), or because they believe their constituents believe in 
religion (in which case the measure would be a permissible 
accommodation).”89 According to Smith, the distinction makes no 
sense, both because legislators are themselves citizens and because 
legislators represent their constituents by acting on their own 
beliefs.90 I agree that such a distinction is flawed (among other 
things, legislators do not generally have only one intention in passing 
a law), but I do not believe that this distinction animates the 
accommodation carve-out. Contrary to Smith’s assumption, under 
current doctrine, a court will not find an accommodation to be an 
endorsement even if the legislators enacting it do so because they 
believe that religion is “true or beneficial,” so long as the record does 
 
Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 246–47 (2002); Daniel A. Farber, Legal 
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988). 
 87. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 88. Smith, supra note 67, at 279. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 280. 
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not indicate that they enacted the accommodation only because they 
think religion is true or beneficial. In a typical case, because 
accommodations do in fact relieve significant burdens on important 
beliefs, it is plausible for the Court to assume, as it does, that at least 
a good part of the reason for granting an accommodation was that 
religion is an important source of value and action that deserves 
respect, even if the legislators also happen to think that religion is 
true or beneficial.91 It is also plausible for the Court to assume that 
this is the message that an accommodation actually sends to 
reasonable objective observers, in the absence of clear evidence 
demonstrating that the legislators intended to send or in fact did send 
the message that religion is true or beneficial.  
In any event, the fact that an accommodation carve out has led 
some observers (those who think that accommodation and 
endorsement are indistinguishable) to believe that the doctrine is 
somewhat incoherent at the margins hardly counts as a devastating 
critique of a doctrine trying to make sense of such an intractable area 
of constitutional law.92 This is particularly true in light of the fact 
that, in the sixteen years since the Court adopted the endorsement 
test, the purported inconsistency between the accommodation and 
endorsement doctrines has posed no particular problems in the 
application of either endorsement or accommodation law. 
The argument that the endorsement test wrongly elevates claims 
of mere offense or symbolic injury to cognizable federal rights is also 
not decisive. To begin with, even those who object to the 
endorsement test on this ground generally concede that remedying 
symbolic harm is not beyond the power of the judicial branch. For 
example, Choper, in explaining that symbolic injury is sufficient to 
satisfy Article III’s “concrete injury” requirement under the Court’s 
standing jurisprudence, acknowledges that “constitutional decisions 
have invalidated laws solely because of their expressive harm, i.e., 
their communication of ‘negative or inappropriate attitudes’ toward 
 
 91. The evenhandedness requirement protects against legislators acting because they think 
that a particular religion is true or beneficial, or even more deserving of respect than others. 
 92. See Marshall, supra note 71, at 498 (“[T]here is a substantial argument to be made 
that the difficulty in achieving an intelligible establishment clause doctrine rests primarily with 
the issue itself and only to a lesser extent with the Court’s deficiencies.”). 
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persons or groups, and have approved nominal damages to remedy 
constitutional violations where actual injury cannot be shown.”93 
Thus, recognizing symbolic injury under the Establishment Clause 
does not create a constitutional anomaly or require courts to engage 
in a completely unfamiliar inquiry. 
Moreover, the recognition and redress of symbolic injuries caused 
by improper church-state relations finds strong support in a growing 
field of legal scholarship focusing on the harms caused by various 
types of government expression.94 This so-called “expressivist 
school” of legal thought contends that “what a law expresses may 
render it unconstitutional, regardless whether any of its tangible or 
material effects are constitutionally troubling.”95 Of course, 
expressivism has been on the receiving end of blistering critiques as 
well,96 and a full defense of the endorsement test must wrestle with 
these criticisms to be complete. I will not engage in such a wrestling 
match here, but simply note that an approach to the Establishment 
Clause focusing on the symbolic dimension of government conduct is 
particularly compelling because the recent increase in national 
religious diversity has caused government-sponsored religious 
messages to become more problematic than ever before,97 and 
because focusing on the perceptions of both non-believers and 
believers directly serves several of the Establishment Clause’s basic 
purposes, including promoting civil peace, respecting individual 
conscience, and protecting religion from the deleterious effects of 
state support.98  
 
 93. Choper, supra note 58, at 529–30 (quoting Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1527 
(2000)). 
 94. See generally Anderson & Pildes, supra note 93. 
 95. Hill, supra note 66, at 510. 
 96. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000). 
 97. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, 
Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 773 
(2001) (“This appraisal of comparative trends, moreover, is not limited to the legal landscape; 
within the political culture as well, the center of gravity of Establishment Clause controversy 
has shifted away from issues involving government money and toward issues of government 
religious messages.”). 
 98. For an excellent argument on this point, see Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 80, at 
727–32. 
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The argument that the endorsement test is indeterminate, provides 
little guidance for lower courts, and will inevitably result in 
inconsistent decisions is a strong critique. However, this claim is 
hardly unique among analytical frameworks in constitutional law,99 
which is filled with such “know it when we see it” tests. To take just 
a few examples from administrative law,100 the endorsement test is 
not really any less determinate than the following: 
• The Morrison v. Olson101 test for deciding whether a 
removal restriction on an executive branch officer is 
unconstitutional because it “impede[s] the President’s 
ability to perform his constitutional duty.”102  
• The Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor103 
test for determining whether Congress can assign a non-
Article III court adjudicatory powers, which considers, 
among other factors, “the extent to which the ‘essential 
attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to Article III 
courts.”104 
• The Mathews v. Eldridge105 test for determining whether 
the government has provided sufficient process for 
withdrawing a legally protected property interest, requiring 
courts to consider the strength of the government interest, 
the strength of the private interest, and the risk that not 
providing additional process will result in an erroneous 
deprivation.106 
Obviously, these examples could be multiplied with the 
consideration of tests employed in other fields of constitutional law. 
To provide one more example, consider the “intermediate scrutiny” 
test that the Court has applied to content-neutral speech restrictions, 
 
 99. See Brownstein, supra note 80, at 847–51. 
 100. Administrative law is a class that I happen to teach from time to time. 
 101. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 102. Id. at 691. 
 103. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 104. Id. at 851. 
 105. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 106. Id. at 335. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/11
p263 Wexler book pages.doc  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  The Endorsement Court 283 
 
 
restrictions on commercial speech, and laws discriminating on the 
basis of gender, among others.107 This standard of scrutiny asks 
whether the government’s interest in enacting the law is sufficiently 
“important” and whether the means chosen are substantially related 
to the law’s objective.108 Like the endorsement test, the intermediate 
scrutiny standard has been roundly criticized as indeterminate and 
resulting in ad hoc judicial decision-making,109 but it has been far 
from unworkable in practice and, in fact, has much support for its 
recommendation.110  
The endorsement test, like these other tests, is an example of 
judicial minimalism, in the sense that it necessarily results in very 
narrow decisions that turn on the specific details and characteristics 
of the particular case being adjudicated.111 Because they are 
minimalistic, these tests will inevitably give little guidance to lower 
courts and may result in inconsistent decisions.112 These are some of 
the costs of minimalism, and they apply to the endorsement test just 
as they do to other minimalistic tests, but there are benefits to 
minimalism as well.113 One of these benefits is that by employing 
judicial minimalism, the Court can take its time with particularly 
difficult issues (such as the proper limits of church-state interaction) 
and allow the state of the law to evolve as the Court learns more 
about the particular circumstances giving rise to these complicated 
controversies.114 As the Court decides more cases, it is hoped that, 
over time, the doctrine will become clearer and more focused, until 
the series of decisions creates a body of jurisprudence that provides 
predictability and adequate guidance. The Court has admittedly not 
 
 107. For a comprehensive discussion of the intermediate standard, see generally Jay D. 
Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 298 (1998). 
 108. See id. at 317–18. 
 109. See id. at 301 (collecting critiques). 
 110. See id. at 325–39 (arguing in favor of the intermediate scrutiny standard). 
 111. On minimalism generally, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
 112. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term Foreword: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28–29 (1996). 
 113. See id. at 7–8. 
 114. See Wexler, supra note 107, at 314–15, 330–39. 
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yet reached this goal with regards to the endorsement test, but this in 
itself is not a critique of any particular minimalist doctrine. 
One could argue that the endorsement test differs from other 
minimalistic constitutional tests in that, by relying on the concept of 
the reasonable observer who views a display in its entire context, it 
adds a level of uncertainty and incoherence not present with the other 
tests. It is true that the reasonable observer concept is subject to the 
criticism that it is independently indeterminate (who is this observer; 
what are his or her characteristics?).115 Further, Jessie Hill is certainly 
correct to suggest that the contextual nature of the endorsement test 
exacerbates its indeterminacy; as she notes, both the physical and 
historical context of any display can be understood in myriad ways 
depending on one’s perspective.116  
I doubt, however, that these features of the endorsement test 
meaningfully differentiate it from other indeterminate constitutional 
tests. All such tests involve terms or concepts, such as “reasonable 
observer” or “historical context,” that are not self-defining and 
require further elaboration from higher courts to be applied with any 
consistency. For instance, without further guidance, how should a 
lower court determine whether an adjudicatory body has exercised an 
“essential attribute” of federal judicial power, whether the private 
interest in a protected property interest is high, low, or somewhere in 
between, whether a government objective is “important” enough to 
pass constitutional muster, or whether a Congressional restriction on 
Presidential power has impeded the President’s ability to carry out his 
constitutional duties? For each of these inquiries, lower courts must 
simply struggle through cases, using their own powers of logic and 
judgment, until higher courts instruct them to do something different. 
The same is true of the endorsement test. Is the “reasonable observer 
a member of one of the regnant faiths, a minority adherent, or an 
atheist?”117 We do not know until the Supreme Court tells us, but 
there is nothing inherent in the concept of the “reasonable observer” 
that would prevent the Court from further specifying what it means. 
 
 115. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Hill, supra note 66, at 522–27. 
 117. Choper, supra note 58, at 511. 
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The same is true with regard to context. Should a lower court 
consider a display’s border to be part of the display or the 
demarcation indicating the end of the display?118 Simply saying that 
lower courts should look at “physical context” does not answer the 
question, of course, but nothing prevents the Supreme Court from 
deciding what approach makes the most sense in most cases and 
instructing lower courts to adopt that approach. Scholars and other 
observers can then argue whether the Court made the right choice, 
but that is a far different matter than saying that the Court’s test is 
indeterminate and subjective. 
These are the critiques of the endorsement test that are either 
misplaced or overstated. On the other hand, the criticism, voiced by 
McConnell, Hill, and others,119 that the endorsement test improperly 
favors majority religions over minority ones is compelling. This is a 
substantive critique, rather than one focused on lack of predictability 
or determinacy. It claims, at least in the version that I prefer, that: (1) 
The endorsement test’s virtues include its support of certain values—
equality, protection of conscience, promoting civil peace120—that 
require judges to attend to the way in which minority religious 
believers (and non-believers) perceive the meaning of religious 
displays and symbols promoting majority traditions;121 and (2) It is 
very difficult for judges who are themselves not, for the most part, 
members of minority traditions to understand those perceptions and 
to empathize with them.122 Of course, a majority bias in the 
application of the endorsement test is not inevitable. Members of the 
Court could recognize the inherent difficulties in understanding the 
perceptions of people who are very different from themselves and 
 
 118. Hill, supra note 66, at 39. 
 119. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
919, 980 (2004) (“Under a minority-protection approach, the non-endorsement test too should 
emphasize the perspective of those in the minority faith.”). To be sure, Berg believes that “the 
protection and equalization of minority faiths should not be the sole criterion for Religion 
Clause cases,” id. at 922, but he does suggest that “the protection and equal status of minority 
faiths and adherents is a significant purpose of religious freedom, even if not the sole or 
conclusive one.” Id. at 923. 
 122. See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 711–12 & 
n.52 (1986). 
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move to counteract these difficulties. For example, the Court could 
establish a presumption against religious displays,123 explicitly 
indicate that courts should carefully consider the perspectives of 
minority believers when deciding cases, or perhaps even invite 
minority traditions to file amicus briefs with the Court.124 However, 
the Court has not taken any of these measures, and, as its recent 
decision upholding the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas 
Capitol grounds demonstrates, it does not explicitly consider minority 
religious believers’ perceptions when deciding these cases. The 
majority decision in Van Orden, for example, contains not a shred of 
consideration of how, for example, a Hindu, a Buddhist, a 
Zoroastrian, a Jew, or an atheist might perceive the monument in 
question. 
Although it does not rise to the importance of the majority-bias 
critique, the argument that the endorsement test undermines the 
dignity of the courts carries some weight as well. What law professor 
has taught these cases without milking them for laughs? What if there 
were two reindeer? What if the menorah was fifty feet high? What 
about three reindeer? What if the menorah did a silly dance? The 
jokes are too easy; they practically write themselves. Why is this? It 
is difficult to make the same kind of jokes in any other area of law, 
even in those areas, such as the ones discussed above, that are also 
highly indeterminate. One could certainly criticize, for example, the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for requiring courts to 
make similar subtle distinctions (Were the drugs in the bag? Was the 
bag open? Was it in the trunk?), but the distinctions are hardly as 
funny. Something about the nature of the displays—that they are 
visual, perhaps, or that they often include sacred objects together with 
everyday ones—makes the endorsement exercise uniquely ridiculous, 
 
 123. See Hill, supra note 66, at 539–44. 
 124. One example of such a brief (not explicitly invited by the Court, of course) was the 
brief submitted in the Pledge of Allegiance case on behalf of various Buddhist organizations 
and believers. This brief is discussed below, see infra notes 182–85 and accompanying text. 
Another possibility, at least at the trial level, would be to ensure that expert witnesses testify as 
to the perceived effects of the challenged symbol or display. As Professor Berg pointed out at 
the symposium, such witnesses do, in fact, sometimes testify. But the introduction of such 
testimony does not seem to have softened the majority bias problem with the endorsement test 
at the appellate or Supreme Court levels, even if it might have some beneficial effects at the 
trial level. 
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even to those who (like me) support it as theoretically sound. Surely 
it is a cause for serious concern when the courts routinely engage in a 
task that is widely perceived as, for lack of a better way to put it, 
downright goofy.  
Interestingly, what both of these critiques of the endorsement test 
share is a focus on the decision-maker who must apply the test, rather 
than on the content of the test itself. This raises the question of 
whether Congress could fashion an institutional arrangement that 
would keep the endorsement test intact, but change the actors who 
apply it. Such an arrangement would be possible and, perhaps, 
desirable. This Article now turns to this topic. 
III. THE ENDORSEMENT COURT, ARTICLE I STYLE 
A. Article I Courts, Generally 
Although Article III of the Constitution provides that the “judicial 
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish,”125 and that the judges of these courts must enjoy both 
salary and tenure protection,126 Congress has long vested 
adjudicatory power in tribunals staffed by decision-makers who enjoy 
neither salary nor tenure protection.127 Examples include not only the 
prominent Tax128 and Bankruptcy Courts129 and the system of federal 
magistrate judges responsible for much of the nation’s initial criminal 
law work,130 but also adjudicatory bodies of all sorts within the 
various federal agencies. The Supreme Court has placed some limits 
on Congress’ authority to grant jurisdiction to these tribunals, most 
famously by striking down the Bankruptcy Courts as constituted in 
 
 125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 126. See id. (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, 
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”). 
 127. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 217–18 (4th ed. 2003). 
 128. See 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2000) (establishing the Tax Court as an Article I court). 
 129. See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (describing appointment of Bankruptcy Judges to fourteen year 
terms, though they are also described as being “judicial officers” of the Article III district 
courts). 
 130. See id. § 631 (providing for the appointment and tenure of magistrate judges). 
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1982,131 but for the most part it has tolerated these arrangements. For 
instance, the Court has upheld the magistrate court system, on the 
grounds that magistrates act “subsidiary to and only in aid of the 
district court,” which maintains “total control and jurisdiction.”132 
The Court has also upheld arrangements allowing agency 
adjudicatory bodies to determine various private claims between 
individuals and organizations that are related to public regulatory 
programs.133 In Schor, the Court articulated the “test”—alluded to 
above134—governing whether jurisdiction in an Article I court or 
agency is proper. It noted: 
Thus, in reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a 
number of factors, none of which has been deemed 
determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the 
congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned 
role of the federal judiciary. Among the factors upon which we 
have focused are the extent to which the “essential attributes of 
judicial power” are reserved to Article III courts, and, 
conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum 
exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested 
only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the 
right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress 
to depart from the requirements of Article III.135 
Courts have held that Congress can vest non-Article III tribunals 
with the power to decide constitutional questions,136 although it is far 
from clear whether such decisions must be reviewable by an Article 
III court, and, if so, whether review by the Article III court must be 
searching in nature. 
 
 131. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 132. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980). 
 133. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); 
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
 134. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 135. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. 
 136. See, e.g., Crawford v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 266 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Rager v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 775 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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B. A Proposed Statute 
It is my contention that something like the following statute would 
be worth Congress’ serious attention: 
The Endorsement Courts Act of 2006 
Sec. 1 Establishment. There shall hereby be established an 
“Endorsement Court” to assist the federal Article III courts 
with adjudication of claims that government symbols or 
displays137 unconstitutionally endorse religion in violation of 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
Sec. 2 Jurisdiction. The Endorsement Court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear any claim that any government symbol or 
display unconstitutionally endorses religion in violation of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
Sec. 3 Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. No Federal District 
Court or Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction to hear any 
claim that any government symbol unconstitutionally endorses 
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States may 
exercise de novo appellate review of any final decision of the 
Endorsement Court at its discretion by writ of certiorari as 
described in 28 U.S.C. 1254. 
Sec. 4 Appointment of Endorsement Court Judges. The 
Endorsement Court shall be staffed by seven Endorsement 
Court Judges. Endorsement Court Judges shall be appointed by 
the Supreme Court of the United States, pursuant to procedures 
established by the Supreme Court.  
 The Endorsement Court shall consist of the following: 
 (a) One Judge with substantial knowledge of a  Protestant 
religious tradition. 
 
 137. Clearly this phrase, as well as other terms in the statute, would need to be defined, and 
such definitions would surely be difficult to craft. This Article does not attempt any such 
definitions, but assumes that a workable definition could be drafted. 
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 (b) One Judge with substantial knowledge of Catholicism. 
 (c) One Judge with substantial knowledge of Judaism. 
 (d) Two Judges with substantial knowledge of an Eastern 
religious tradition, including Buddhism,  Hinduism, Taoism, or 
Confucianism. 
 (e) One Judge with substantial knowledge of a  religious 
tradition not represented in subsections (a)–(d). 
 (f) One Judge with substantial knowledge of atheism.138  
Sec. 5 Tenure of Endorsement Court Judges. Each 
Endorsement Court Judge shall serve for a period of three 
years,139 unless removed prior to the end of the term by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The President of the 
United States shall have the power to remove any member of 
the Endorsement Court only in cases of malfeasance or 
neglect.140  
Sec. 6 Salary of Endorsement Court Judges. The salary of 
Endorsement Court Judges shall be [some reasonable amount]. 
 
 138. As noted below, the mix of knowledge reflected in this section is by way of example 
only; a different mix may be preferable, or perhaps the statute would work better simply by 
requiring appointment of judges who reflect a broad knowledge about religion. Professor Berg 
suggested at the symposium, quite persuasively, that dividing up the religious universe in the 
way the draft statute does is only one way to split up that universe, and not necessarily the best 
way. For example, Professor Berg is certainly correct to say that another quite relevant, perhaps 
better, way to split up the religious universe would be to follow the insight of James Davison 
Hunter, who roughly divides modern religious belief into progressive and orthodox visions. 
JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 107–31 
(1991). As a theoretical matter, this may indeed be a better way to classify religious beliefs in 
the modern world. As a practical matter, it would probably be much more difficult to write such 
a classification into a statute such as this one.  Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the 
statute calls for its members to have “substantial knowledge” of certain religious traditions, not 
that they themselves are members of those traditions (a qualification which would be 
constitutionally problematic for reasons discussed below). It seems to me that those who have 
substantial knowledge of certain religious traditions would likely possess knowledge of 
different varieties within those traditions, both orthodox and progressive, and could understand 
how both orthodox and progressive members of those traditions would view a religious symbol 
or display. 
 139. There is nothing particularly magical about three years; perhaps five or seven or some 
other length would work better. 
 140. Perhaps the President should have no removal power at all. 
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Sec. 7 Supervision of Endorsement Court Judges. Endorsement 
Court Judges shall be subject to the supervision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, with respect to disciplinary action 
and other relevant administrative matters. 
Sec. 8 Procedures. Claims shall be presented to the 
Endorsement Court, and the Endorsement Court shall hold a 
hearing on those claims, pursuant to procedures established by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. Those procedures 
shall provide, at a minimum, for the written and oral 
presentation of evidence and arguments to the Endorsement 
Court by the party challenging the government symbol or 
display and the party defending such symbol or display. 
Sec. 9 Final Decision. The Endorsement Court shall, within a 
reasonable time following a hearing, render a final written 
decision and order regarding whether the challenged symbol or 
display constitutes an endorsement of religion, as defined and 
explained by the Supreme Court of the United States. One 
Endorsement Court Judge shall write a majority decision 
representing the views of the majority of the Endorsement 
Court. Individual Endorsement Court Judges may contribute 
additional concurring or dissenting opinions as warranted. 
Congress urges individual Endorsement Court Judges to 
provide written explanations of how the challenged symbols or 
displays would affect the adherents of the religious traditions 
with which they possess knowledge. Orders of the 
Endorsement Court become final and enforceable upon 
issuance.  
Before I engage in an analysis of the desirability of such a statute, 
several caveats are in order. First, I have drafted the statute in more 
or less ordinary language, rather than making an effort to have the 
proposal read like an actual statute. Thus, the statute may be less 
precise than it should or would be if it were a real proposal.141 
 
 141. For example, I have made no effort to define the words “symbol” or “display” (or 
“religious” for that matter). Clearly, these words would have to be defined, and, just as clearly, 
whatever definitions would ultimately be included in the statute would cause problems (and 
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Second, although the intent of the statute is to decrease somewhat the 
involvement of the federal courts with the endorsement test, and to 
give much of that work to a non-Article III tribunal staffed by 
individuals with knowledge of a range of religions, I absolutely am 
not wedded to the specific arrangement put forth by the draft statute, 
including the precise mix of religious knowledge referred to in 
section four. It is but one example of the general notion I attempt to 
advance; variations within the general scheme may prove to be 
preferable either as a policy or constitutional matter, and I will 
attempt to note these possible alternatives in my discussion. Finally, I 
mean what I say in the sentence immediately prior to the draft statute: 
My claim is not that such a statute would definitely be more desirable 
than the current regime, but rather only that such a statute is worth 
consideration and discussion, even if only as a way of thinking about 
how federal judges should apply the endorsement test. 
C. Constitutional Issues 
This subsection identifies the various constitutional issues raised 
by the draft statute and addresses them briefly, with the intention of 
noting where the statute might be most vulnerable to attack and how 
it might be tweaked to avoid these problems if necessary.142 It is 
worth noting at the outset that the Supreme Court has given little 
guidance as to many of the issues raised by the statute, and therefore 
there is ultimately no way to predict with any certainty whether any 
particular part of the statute would be held unconstitutional. Indeed, 
this may be an additional independent advantage of enacting such a 
statute. Given that it would almost certainly be challenged, it could 
result in new law clarifying Congress’ limits when it seeks to create 
alternative institutional arrangements to vindicate federal rights. The 
following subsections address the most important constitutional 
issues potentially raised by the draft statute, namely whether the 
jurisdictional provision violates Article III and whether the 
 
litigation) at the margins. This problem, however, hardly distinguishes the draft statute from 
any other statute. 
 142. The statute could even be written to address certain contingencies, such that if one 
part of the statute is found unconstitutional, a different section remedying the constitutional 
problem will take effect. 
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appointment provision violates either the Appointment Clause of 
Article II or the Religious Test Clause of Article VI.143 
1. Jurisdictional Provision 
First, of course, there are potential constitutional problems with 
the basic arrangement—that is, stripping the lower federal courts of 
jurisdiction over the endorsement issue and vesting it with an Article 
I court, subject only to discretionary, but full, Supreme Court review. 
Taking the jurisdiction-stripping subissue first, no judicial or 
scholarly consensus exists regarding Congress’ power to limit the 
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, except to the extent that it is 
“untenable” to suggest “that lower federal courts created by Congress 
must have the full judicial power described in Article III.”144 
Nonetheless, there is a good chance that the arrangement put forth by 
the draft statute would be held constitutional. First, it finds support in 
Articles III’s text, which gives Congress discretion to create lower 
federal courts in the first place.145 Based on this text, some have 
advanced the persuasive argument that Congress’ power to refuse to 
create lower federal courts implies the lesser power to restrict the 
jurisdiction of those courts once they have been created.146 If this is 
true, the basic arrangement of the draft statute would certainly be 
constitutional.  
Even under theories suggesting limits on Congress’ power to 
restrict the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, certain features of the 
proposed statute weigh heavily in favor of its constitutionality. First, 
 
 143. Of course, these are not the only potential constitutional issues raised by the draft 
statute. For example, the statute could be subject to attack on Establishment Clause grounds 
because of its specific mandate to include religious knowledge as a prerequisite for the exercise 
of governmental authority, or for requiring too precise a mix of religious knowledge on the 
Endorsement Court. The statute may also raise separation of powers problems as well, for 
example through the requirement that the Supreme Court develop procedures for the 
Endorsement Court to follow.  
 144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 191; see also id. at 192 (noting that “this theory . . . 
has not been followed at any point in American history”). 
 145. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”) (emphasis added). 
 146. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 192–96, 192 n.3 (discussing this argument and 
citing authorities). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p263 Wexler book pages.doc  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 21:263 
 
 
the statute does nothing to affect state court jurisdiction over 
endorsement claims, which Congress has no power to affect. The 
Supreme Court would continue to have full jurisdiction to review 
judgments of the highest state court that are based on the First 
Amendment. Second, under the statute, the Supreme Court has full, if 
discretionary, jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Endorsement 
Court, so that the statute does not cut off all federal court 
consideration of the endorsement issue. Finally, although the 
Endorsement Court is not an Article III court, it is substantially 
controlled by one with respect to both the appointment and removal 
of its members and disciplinary and administrative matters. These 
provisions ensure that an Article III tribunal remains a very vital 
component in the enforcement of the non-endorsement right. 
An examination of some of the more prominent arguments for 
limiting Congress’ power to restrict lower federal court jurisdiction 
demonstrates the strengths of the draft statute.147 For example, Justice 
Story once advanced the famous theory, based on the “shall be 
vested” language of Article III,148 that some federal court review of 
all federal claims must be available, and therefore that, in cases in 
which state court review of a federal claim is unavailable, there must 
be some lower federal court to hear the claim or else no federal court 
will be able to do so (because Congress cannot expand the original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court149).150 This theory, however, does 
not threaten the draft statute, both because state court review of 
endorsement claims remains available and because the statute 
provides for review by the Supreme Court of the Endorsement 
Court’s decisions.  
Professor Eisenberg’s theory, which rests in large part on the 
difficulty of Supreme Court superintendence over federal law in an 
 
 147. Of course, the Court has required Congress to indicate with extreme clarity its intent 
to bar review of constitutional claims before recognizing such limits. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 
486 U.S. 592 (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). The draft statute is worded 
with the intent to be extremely clear regarding preclusion of lower federal court review of 
endorsement claims for this reason. 
 148. See supra note 126. 
 149. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 150. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328–31 (1816). 
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era of excessive population and litigiousness,151 is more threatening 
to the draft statute’s jurisdiction stripping provision. However, the 
threat is somewhat undermined by the draft statute’s focus on one 
specific issue (rather than eradicating the lower federal courts 
altogether) and by its provision vesting control of its personnel in the 
Supreme Court (giving the Supreme Court more superintendence 
power over endorsement law than it otherwise would have in a 
typical jurisdiction stripping scenario). 
Whether the draft statute’s vesting of jurisdiction of endorsement 
claims in the Endorsement Court would survive review under the 
Schor test is similarly unclear. But again, several factors weigh in 
favor of the statute’s constitutionality. Much like the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) jurisdiction to hear state law 
counterclaims, upheld in Schor, the draft statute also grants the 
Endorsement Court power over only a “‘particularized area of law,’” 
and does not give it the power to exercise “‘all ordinary powers of 
district courts.’”152 Also, the Endorsement Court’s decisions are 
subject to de novo review by an Article III court, an important factor 
in Schor and in other cases.153 Although the Endorsement Court’s 
orders (unlike those of the CFTC in Schor) are self-enforcing, district 
court enforcement was only one of several factors examined by the 
Schor court.154 If necessary, the draft statute could be amended to 
require district court enforcement, preferably with a provision 
requiring district court enforcement in the great majority of cases—
for example, when the district court finds that the Endorsement 
Court’s order is not “clearly erroneous” in light of Supreme Court 
precedent. Finally, the “nature of the claim”—namely, that it is a 
constitutional one—probably weighs somewhat against the draft 
statute in the overall Schor balance. However, the fact that the 
Supreme Court retains appointment, removal, and supervision power 
over the Endorsement Court (a feature not present in any other 
relevant case) weighs heavily the other way, because it ensures that 
 
 151. Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court 
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974). 
 152. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1986) (quoting 
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)). 
 153. Id. at 852. 
 154. See id. 
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ultimate control over the application of the endorsement test remains 
in the hands of an Article III tribunal. 
2. Appointment Provision 
The appointment provision of the draft statute performs several 
important functions. It ensures that the Supreme Court, an Article III 
tribunal, maintains substantial control over the Endorsement Court, 
which (as just described) is an important safeguard against an Article 
III challenge to the statute. The appointment provision also ensures 
that the members of the Endorsement Court possess knowledge of a 
variety of religious traditions, both majority and minority, to alleviate 
the majority-bias critique of the endorsement test.155  
However, there are at least three possible problems with the 
appointment provision of the draft statute. First, one can plausibly 
argue that vesting appointment of the Endorsement Court members in 
the Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Appointments Clause of 
Article II. This clause provides that the President has the power (with 
the advice and consent of the Senate) to appoint “Officers of the 
United States,” but Congress may vest the appointment of “inferior 
Officers . . . in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the 
Heads of Departments.”156 Members of the Endorsement Court are 
almost certainly “officers,” given their important duties and authority 
to enter final orders;157 thus, whether Congress can vest the power to 
appoint these members in the Supreme Court (a “Court[] of Law”)158 
turns on whether they are inferior or principal officers. At one point, 
the Supreme Court answered this question by applying yet another 
multi-factored test, focusing on the nature and duration of the 
 
 155. There is nothing particularly special in having seven members of the Endorsement 
Court, or in the specific mix of religious traditions delineated in sections 4(a)-(f) of the draft 
statute. It may be the case that more (or fewer) judges would better serve the goals of the 
statute, or that a different, more diverse mix of traditions would be preferable. Perhaps the 
statute could be even more vague, specifying only that the members of the Endorsement Court 
“shall possess a broad range of religious knowledge,” or something similar. 
 156. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 157. Government officials who exercise “significant governmental authority” are officers 
who must be appointed pursuant to the requirements of the Appointments Clause. Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 
(1991). 
 158. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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officer’s jurisdiction, the extent of the officer’s powers and duties, 
and whether the officer is subject to removal by another officer.159 
Today, it seems that, at least “[g]enerally speaking,” the Court 
decides the question by asking whether the officer is “supervised” by 
some other officer.160 If the officer is supervised, he is inferior; if not, 
he is principal. 
Although the question is by no means free from doubt,161 
substantial arguments support classifying the Endorsement Court 
judges as inferior officers. In Edmond v. United States, the Supreme 
Court held that judges on the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals 
were inferior officers because their decisions were reviewable by a 
higher court and because they were administratively supervised by 
the Judge Advocate General.162 Likewise, Endorsement Court judges 
are administratively supervised by the Supreme Court (and can be 
removed without cause), and their decisions are subject to review by 
the Court. Indeed, the reviewability issue cuts even more heavily here 
than in Edmond, because the Supreme Court would review decisions 
of the Endorsement Court de novo, whereas the Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces exercised a more narrow scope of review over the 
Court of Criminal Appeals’ decisions.163 Nor can Edmond be 
distinguished on the ground that Endorsement Court Judges, because 
they decide constitutional issues, serve more important purposes than 
the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals judges; the latter presided 
over a variety of criminal cases, including those involving the death 
penalty,164 and therefore handled an even broader array of 
constitutional issues than would the Endorsement Court judges.  
Second, one might argue that, by placing qualifications on who 
the Supreme Court may appoint to serve on the Endorsement Court—
namely, the “substantial knowledge” requirements contained in 
 
 159. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Applying this test, the appointment of the 
Endorsement Court judges would likely, though not certainly, be constitutional. Their duties are 
limited to adjudicating one area of law, and their judgments are subject to de novo review by an 
Article III tribunal. 
 160. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997). 
 161. For one thing, federal district judges and federal circuit court judges are generally 
considered to be principal officers. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 191 & n.7 (1994). 
 162. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664. 
 163. See id. at 665. 
 164. See id. 
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sections 4(a)-(f)—the statute infringes on the Court’s Appointment 
Clause power to choose whoever it wants to fill positions. In other 
words, this argument asserts that the only power the Appointment 
Clause grants to Congress with respect to inferior officers is to 
choose which body (the President alone, a court of law, or a head of 
an agency) may appoint them. Once Congress makes this choice, the 
argument suggests, the body that Congress has chosen has unbridled 
discretion to fill the inferior officer position.  
This argument has a strong textual appeal, but it is highly unlikely 
that any court would adopt it. Congress has long established 
qualification restrictions with respect to both principal and inferior 
officers, and the current United States Code is filled with them.165 
Moreover, Supreme Court dicta supports the notion that Congress can 
impose reasonable qualification restrictions on the choice of 
appointees.166 In addition, an early Attorney General opinion concurs 
with this notion, so long as the qualification restriction gives the 
appointing officer significant leeway in choosing who to appoint.167 
Finally, the notion that Congress can impose reasonable qualification 
restrictions on appointments is not only supported by long-standing 
and widespread institutional practice, but has theoretical appeal as 
well. This is so because one can explain this authority as simply an 
incident to Congress’ unquestioned power to create offices in the first 
place.  
Finally, one could argue that the Religious Test Clause of Article 
VI independently prohibits the religious knowledge qualifications of 
section 4(a)-(f) of the draft statute. The Religious Test Clause 
provides that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
 
 165. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (requiring that no more than three of the six members of 
the FEC may be of the same political party); 5 U.S.C. § 8472 (providing that in making 
appointments to the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, the President must consult 
with various members of Congress); 10 U.S.C. § 4337 (requiring that the Chaplain of the U.S. 
military must be a “clergyman”); 16 U.S.C. § 3632 (providing for appointment of Pacific 
Salmon Treaty commissioners); 28 U.S.C. § 505 (requiring that the Solicitor General must be 
“learned in the law”); 38 U.S.C. § 305(a)(2) (requiring that the Undersecretary of Health in 
HHS must be selected without “regard to political affiliation”). 
 166. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 129 (1926). 
 167. Civil Service Commission, 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 520 (1871). 
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States.”168 Certainly, on some level, the requirement that an appointee 
have “substantial knowledge” of a particular religious tradition 
sounds like a religious “test,” but the “test” of which the clause 
speaks refers to “affirmations” of religious beliefs, rather than to 
“examinations” of religious knowledge.169 Perhaps one could argue 
that the religious knowledge requirement serves as a proxy for 
religious affiliation, and therefore that these requirements in fact 
promote the very evil with which the framers were concerned when 
they drafted this Clause.  
I agree that the Clause should be construed to refer to true proxies 
for religious affiliation, but at least two factors weigh in favor of not 
finding such an illegitimate proxy present here. First, there is a real 
difference between religious affiliation and religious knowledge. The 
entire academic field of religious studies is based on the assumption 
that possessing knowledge about a religious tradition is quite 
different from believing in its tenets or truth.170 Second, knowledge 
of a religious tradition, rather than belief in its claims, is, in fact, the 
qualification that best serves the purposes of the statute. Because the 
endorsement inquiry focuses on what a “reasonable observer” would 
think about a challenged symbol or display, rather than on what any 
one adherent would think, the knowledge requirement best ensures 
that the Endorsement Court judge will have some idea of what the 
average adherent of the religious tradition would think about the 
display. Thus, the statute does not intend to ensure that an adherent of 
the religious tradition in question is selected to serve on the Court. 
D. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Draft Statute 
This section briefly discusses the advantages and disadvantages of 
enacting a statute such as that proposed by this Article. Because I 
argue that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, I will first 
discuss the statute’s drawbacks, and then examine its benefits. 
 
 168. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
 169. See Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of 
Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1987). 
 170. For discussion of teaching about religion in an objective manner, see generally Jay D. 
Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic Education, 
and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159 (2002). 
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1. Disadvantages 
At least four disadvantages to adopting the draft statute come to 
mind.171 First, as the statute’s constitutionality would certainly be 
challenged172 because it raises difficult and important constitutional 
questions,173 adopting the statute would result in expensive and time-
consuming litigation. Moreover, if the statute is found wholly 
unconstitutional, the time, money, and effort spent to enact it would 
be wasted, except for the fact that it may be valuable to force the 
courts to weigh in on one or more of the novel issues raised. 
Nonetheless, this potential problem, though real, is fairly minor 
compared to the advantages of the statute. 
Second, the statute places an increased administrative burden on 
the Supreme Court. By requiring the Court to promulgate rules 
governing Endorsement Court procedures, to appoint the judges of 
the Endorsement Court, and to supervise those judges (including 
possibly removing them), the statute requires the Court to undertake 
additional burdensome responsibilities. On the other hand, the Court 
already has many such responsibilities, and enjoys an administrative 
apparatus to support its obligations. So long as Congress provides 
additional funding for administrative support, the increased 
administrative burden imposed by the statute is not overly 
demanding. Regardless, if one views this as a significant problem, 
only the appointment and removal powers must necessarily reside 
with the Court (for constitutional reasons174). Congress could 
promulgate the Endorsement Court procedures itself or delegate this 
duty to another body, either to one that already exists or to a new one 
established by the draft statute. 
 
 171. There may certainly be other disadvantages. For example, it was pointed out at the 
symposium that the draft statute may create a conflict of interest problem, since the Supreme 
Court, which reviews the work of the Endorsement Court, appoints the members of that Court. 
It was also pointed out that the Endorsement Court in many ways resembles the Federal Circuit, 
which many believe has failed to live up to its promise as a specialized tribunal. 
 172. The statute, as I envision it, would not strip the courts of jurisdiction to consider its 
own constitutionality; indeed, it may be wise to include a specific provision creating fast-track 
jurisdiction in a single court to hear the inevitable challenge that would be brought against the 
law. 
 173. See supra notes 141–70 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
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Third, placing the adjudication of the endorsement issue in the 
hands of a non-Article III tribunal may send the unwanted message 
that the right protected by the Establishment Clause’s non-
endorsement norm is not particularly important. If the statute sent this 
message, it would be a serious problem, although one that likely 
would not outweigh the benefits of the statute, specifically with 
respect to its promotion of the non-endorsement norm.175 Although it 
is certainly possible that some may receive this message from the 
adoption of the statute, particularly given that the media does not 
always communicate legal developments in the most accurate 
fashion, it is unlikely that this is the message that most people will 
receive. Not only does the statute keep the Supreme Court ultimately 
in charge of enforcing the right at issue, but the statute’s very purpose 
is also to make this right more robust by entrusting its enforcement to 
an adjudicatory body staffed by individuals more attuned to its 
importance. Because the message received will be undesirable only if 
the statute’s goal somehow becomes distorted, it is unwise to decline 
to pass the statute simply because of the message it might possibly 
send. If such distortion appears to be a particularly likely possibility, 
members of Congress responsible for this legislation could make 
extra efforts to emphasize the pro-endorsement rights message 
intended by the statute. 
Finally, precluding lower federal court review of endorsement 
questions may set an undesirable precedent that would support the 
preclusion of judicial review of other important constitutional claims. 
Members of Congress have periodically endorsed stripping 
jurisdiction to hear claims the members disagree with from the 
federal courts, including claims regarding abortion rights, school 
prayer, and other controversial issues.176 Such preclusion would not, 
of course, be a good idea from a minority rights perspective or from 
the perspective that federal courts should maintain the power to 
control the shape and enforcement of constitutional rights generally. 
If it were true that the draft statute would, in fact, set such a 
precedent, this would make the statute undesirable. This is because 
augmenting protection of the endorsement right is not worth the 
 
 175. See infra notes 181–85 and accompanying text. 
 176. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 127, at 170. 
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sacrifice of other more fragile, and arguably more important, 
constitutional rights. However, it is unlikely that the draft statute, if 
understood correctly, will set such a precedent. For one thing, the 
statute maintains federal court control over the right at issue, both by 
allowing for Supreme Court review and by providing for Supreme 
Court oversight of the Endorsement Court itself. More importantly, 
the statute’s purpose is to augment protection of the right, rather than 
to undermine it. The statute’s underlying premise is that the 
endorsement test is fundamentally correct, but enforced by 
suboptimal decision-makers. This is very different from the premise 
of other jurisdiction-stripping efforts, whose starting points are 
generally that the right in question is fundamentally incorrect. Thus, 
defenders of the draft statute, and minority rights more generally, can 
successfully distinguish this statute from other attempts to strip the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
2. Advantages 
The advantages of the draft statute outweigh its disadvantages. I 
will discuss three of the advantages here, in increasing order of 
importance. First, entrusting primary endorsement adjudication to 
one body, instead of to numerous district courts and courts of 
appeals, will unify and standardize the law governing the display of 
religious symbols throughout the country.177 This is advantageous 
both with regard to specific types of displays (e.g., we would know 
whether “In God We Trust” or Ten Commandments monuments 
sponsored by the Fraternal Order of Eagles would be constitutional 
throughout the nation) and to important questions of endorsement 
law, such as those identified by Choper, Hill, and others (e.g., what 
qualifies as the physical context of a display or what characteristics 
should we assume the reasonable observer to possess).178 In a sense, 
of course, this argument proves too much; if uniformity and 
standardization were considered to be an advantage significant 
enough to justify altering the federal court system, such virtues might 
 
 177. Of course, state courts would continue to provide some variety and experimentation, 
at least on issues not directly considered by the Supreme Court. 
 178. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
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justify the eradication of lower federal courts entirely, something I 
certainly do not endorse. On the other hand, promoting uniformity 
and certainty in this one small area of constitutional law may be 
uniquely beneficial as compared to other areas, given the inherently 
indeterminate and ambiguous nature of the endorsement test. 
Second, removing endorsement claims from the lower federal 
courts would free them from having to decide the many minute and 
seemingly silly (to some) questions required by the endorsement test. 
To the extent that courts appear undignified and even ridiculous when 
they spill ink to resolve such issues as whether a display’s flowered 
border is part of a challenged display,179 whether the presence of 
evergreen trees changes the meaning of a display,180 or whether 
painting a figure alters a display’s overall message,181 the creation of 
the Endorsement Court will ameliorate these difficulties. The average 
First Amendment class may elicit less laughter than before, but legal 
scholars, news journalists, and concerned citizens would likely hold 
the federal courts in higher regard than they do now.  
By far the most important advantage of the Endorsement Court, 
however, is that it places the adjudication of the endorsement test into 
the hands of individuals who know something about religion, who 
represent a variety of majority and minority religious traditions, and 
who can be expected to apply the test in a way that will promote the 
test’s important purposes. As it currently stands, the endorsement test 
entrusts judges who are generally members of majority religious 
traditions with the responsibility of deciding whether a state-
sponsored display or symbol sends a message to outsiders that they 
are not political equals. While it certainly is not impossible for such a 
judge to make this determination in a reasonable fashion, the task is a 
highly difficult one. After all, the test, by its very terms, requires 
judges to get inside the heads of members of the minority tradition to 
attempt to understand how that person would perceive the message. 
Of course, it is far easier for someone deeply acquainted with a 
minority tradition to understand how a government sponsored 
message would be perceived by a member of that tradition. To the 
 
 179. Hill, supra note 66, at 522–23. 
 180. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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extent that one of the endorsement test’s primary purposes is to 
protect the interests of those whose beliefs are not part of the 
mainstream, creation of the Endorsement Court would constitute a 
significant advance from the status quo. 
As just one example, consider the amicus brief submitted to the 
Supreme Court in the Pledge of Allegiance case (Elk Grove Unified 
School District v. Newdow)182 on behalf of 300,000 Buddhist 
Americans.183 This unique brief, which argued that the Pledge is 
unconstitutional as currently written, attempted to communicate how 
the average Buddhist views the Pledge’s phrase “under God,” and to 
explain why the average Buddhist believes that the phrase is 
inconsistent with his or her religious beliefs.184 The brief explained in 
some detail, with relevant citations and quotations, why Buddhists do 
not believe in the concept of God and why the Pledge endorses a 
view of ultimate reality inconsistent with Buddhism. For example, in 
summarizing its case against the Pledge, the brief argued: 
When Buddhist schoolchildren recite the words describing this 
as a nation “under God,” they voice the name of a deity from a 
particular religious tradition that is different from their own, 
they articulate a religious concept that is inconsistent with their 
religion, they violate the ethical teaching prohibiting untrue 
utterances, and they exalt a concept that clashes with the 
“awakening to supreme wisdom” that is their religion’s very 
goal.185 
One might argue that briefs such as these can alleviate the 
endorsement test’s inherent majority bias by informing the Justices 
how various minority religions view certain displays or symbols. The 
Justices could then use this information to help them empathize with 
 
 182. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 183. Brief Amicus Curiae Buddhist Temples, Centers and Organizations Representing over 
300,000 Buddhist Americans in Support of Respondents, Elk Grove, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624), 
2004 WL 298115 [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. 
 184. Of course, it is unclear whether the draft statute would extend to a claim regarding the 
Pledge of Allegiance’s constitutionality, since the statute as currently drafted does not define 
the terms “display” or “symbol.” 
 185. Amicus Brief, supra note 183, at 23–24. The brief goes on to argue that excusing 
religious objectors from having to recite the Pledge does not cure the constitutional violation. 
Id. at 24–26. 
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these minority perspectives. This argument surely carries some 
weight, but, ultimately, briefs such as that in the Pledge case can only 
do so much. Not only are the Justices swamped by amicus briefs in 
important cases—and therefore cannot possibly pay serious attention 
to all of them—but reading about a religious perspective does not 
translate directly into empathizing with that perspective. This is 
particularly true when the perspective is communicated through the 
relatively dry and straightforward vehicle of a legal brief. It is 
unlikely, therefore, that the submission of amicus briefs could 
significantly resolve the problem of majority bias in the application 
of the endorsement test. Although it is hardly conclusive evidence, it 
is notable that neither the government’s reply brief nor any of the 
opinions in the Newdow case itself referred specifically to the 
Buddhists’ brief. 
On the other hand, it is far more likely that the perspectives 
illuminated by this brief would play some role in a decision of the 
Endorsement Court. If one of the members of the court has 
substantial knowledge of Buddhism, that member will likely have 
already internalized the message of the brief, and will bring it to bear 
on his or her decision. Even if there is no member of the court with 
substantial knowledge of Buddhism, those members possessing 
knowledge of some other minority tradition will be more likely to 
understand and empathize with the Buddhist perspective, and thus to 
consider that perspective seriously when rendering a verdict on the 
symbol or display in question. Either way, there is a substantial 
likelihood that entrusting endorsement questions to an Endorsement 
Court will result in decisions more protective of minority believers 
than those rendered by the lower federal courts under the current 
system. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
With the recent retirement of Justice O’Connor, the future of the 
endorsement test is highly uncertain. For this reason, it is worth 
pausing at this moment to consider the merits and drawbacks of the 
test, which is one of the Rehnquist Court’s most important First 
Amendment contributions. The test has endured much criticism in its 
twenty years of existence, but many of these criticisms are overstated. 
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The endorsement test’s most notable flaw rests not in its content, but 
in the disconnect between its content and the institutional actors who 
must apply it. Federal judges, who are generally members of majority 
religious traditions, are not particularly well-suited for understanding 
how government sponsored messages will be understood by those 
who belong to minority traditions. As a result, the endorsement test, 
as currently applied, risks an unfortunate majority-religion bias. One 
possible solution to this problem is for Congress to entrust the 
adjudication of endorsement claims to a so-called “Endorsement 
Court” staffed by members with substantial knowledge of a range of 
religious traditions, both majority and minority. Such a radical 
solution poses its own problems, not the least of which is the 
possibility that the court would be struck down on constitutional 
grounds. However, the proposal also carries the quite significant 
advantage of ensuring that the endorsement test is applied in a 
manner that protects the very minority believers in need of its 
protection. Such a solution, therefore, is worth Congress’ serious 
attention. 
Regardless of whether Congress ever considers such an option 
(and it is, of course, quite unlikely ever to do so), considering the 
possibility of creating such an Endorsement Court is a worthwhile 
exercise in itself because it forces us to consider how endorsement 
decisions would differ if they were made by judges who were 
informed by substantial knowledge of a range of religious traditions 
and perspectives and gave serious thought to how a religious symbol 
or display would be understood by a reasonable observer of a 
minority tradition. In a sense, then, the Endorsement Court is an 
experiment in thought more than anything else. There is no reason 
why judicial decision-makers (as well as policy-makers from the 
other branches of government) should be unable to consider the 
legitimacy, constitutional or otherwise, of a religious display from the 
imagined perspective of minority believers. If Congress will not, or 
cannot, place the application of the endorsement test in the hands of 
minority religious believers, perhaps the message of this Article is 
that the legal decision-makers vested with such power should 
reimagine themselves as a way of solving the test’s most intractable 
difficulties.
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